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Abstract 
The significance of governance has been recognized in IT Outsourcing (ITO) research and practice. 
While the concept of governance is rooted from various reference disciplines, as a leading knowledge 
resource for outsourcing, the discipline of IS has contributed to the conceptualization of ITO govern-
ance with multiplex interpretations and from different aspects. To synthesize these contributions of IS 
scholars, we conducted a literature review within IS discipline, and identified two research strands: 
governance structure and governance mechanisms. With our findings, we describe how “structuring" 
the governance means defining the combination of an appropriate portfolio of governance structures, 
together with different coordination mechanisms at different stages of the ITO lifecycle. Furthermore, 
we discuss how the ITO research community can be informed by reference disciplines on the concep-
tualization of governance. On this basis, we suggest the existing gaps and future directions of research 
on ITO governance. 
Keywords: Governance, IT outsourcing, Literature review, Governance structures, Governance 
mechanisms. 
1 Introduction 
In the earliest comprehensive literature review on Information Technology Outsourcing (ITO), 
Dibbern, Goles, Hirschheim and Jayatilaka (2004) delineate the historical landscape of ITO research 
during the years 1992-2000. They argue that the research domain was already maturing, having devel-
oped a diversity of focal objectives, theoretical bases and relevant methods during the first decades 
since the emergence of ITO practice. Considering the lifecycle of ITO practice, research attention had 
been shifted from the initial decision process to post-adoption implementation issues. By the end of 
last millennium, researchers had started to scrutinize the client-supplier relationship beyond the scope 
of outsourcing contract, including the psychological aspect of relations. More recently, Lacity, Khan, 
Yan, and Willcocks (2010) reviewed 164 empirical papers on ITO published during 1992-2010, in 
which they identified the two most important relations among ITO concepts, i.e. between ITO decision 
and contractual governance, and between contractual and relational governance. Furthermore, both 
contractual governance and relational governance are recognized as important categories of constructs 
to build endogenous theories in ITO (Lacity, Willcocks, and Khan, 2011); whereas implying to prac-
tice, governance is also identified as crucial for ITO success (Lacity, Khan, & Willcocks, 2009) and 
innovation (Weeks & Feeny, 2008). 
The concept of governance is rooted from various reference disciplines, such as economics, marketing, 
management, and organization studies. The perspectives on governance vary with different philosoph-
ical stances and in different disciplinary traditions. For instance, Bevir (2009) counts fifty definitions 
and concepts of governance. In the concept of governance often we find terms as rules, control, order, 
govern, guidance, authority. Lynn (2010) defines governance as “the action or manner of governing – 
that is, of directing, guiding, or regulating individuals, organizations, or nations in conduct or ac-
tions” (p.671). Hughes (2010) combines the Latin term “gubernare” with other meanings to frame the 
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concept of governance around three sub-themes: leading organizations, organizing firms, and defining 
procedures to drive organizations. Salamon (2002) defines governance as the set of rules, concepts and 
processes that drive and regulate the individual interacts to get common intents. In Salamon’s (2002) 
perspective governance is embedded into social, political and economic interactions; while Dixit 
(2009) define governance mainly with reference to the rules of the game (i.e. the institutional frame-
work) rather than the play of the game (i.e. as between the parties to a transaction, with emphasis on 
private ordering). Such multiplicity of interpretation results in indeterminate and vague understandings 
of the concept, especially when different definitions are simultaneously adopted in interdisciplinary 
studies such as outsourcing. 
In the field of IS research, governance is primarily studied in the subject of “IT governance”, which is 
regarded as a constituent part of enterprise governance (Van Grembergen, 2004). In particular, Weill’s 
(2004) definition of IT governance, “the framework for decision rights and accountabilities to encour-
age desirable behaviour in the use of IT” (p.3), has been widely adopted. In the research of ITO gov-
ernance such conceptualization of governance, considering ITO as a specific form of IT governance 
(Loh and Venkatraman, 1991), is related to the predominance of transaction cost approach (William-
son 1975, Barthélemy 2001, Lacity and Hirscheim 1993). In this view many scholars have pointed out 
the role of contracts for successful management of outsourcing processes (Saunders et al. 1997, Lacity 
et al. 1995), and contract is identified as a mechanism to regulate and govern the transaction. Howev-
er, Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) may not serve as a comprehensive analytical lens for ITO, es-
pecially in collaborations emphasizing relational characteristics where contracts become “incomplete” 
(Willcocks et al., 1999) and additional governance mechanisms must be used. In response to such 
needs for alternative theoretical understandings, studies on relational mechanisms have emerged and 
informed governance research in the last decade, with various perspectives such as psychological con-
tract (Kim, Shin, & Lee, 2013; Koh, Ang, & Straub, 2004), trust (Heiskanen, Newman, & Eklin, 2008; 
Sabherwal, 1999) and clan control (Chua, Lim, Soh, and Sia, 2012b). As such, prior ITO research has 
generated a rich knowledge base on the understanding of governance from many aspects and under 
different contexts. Many scholars claim (Bapna, Barua, Mani, & Mehra, 2010; Lacity et al., 2009, 
2011; Miranda & Kevan, 2005), indeed, the study of governance is important for ITO research and 
practice, whereas the concept of governance is built upon a multiple paradigm approach (Lewis & 
Grimes, 1999), bridging different perspectives from reference disciplines, such as economics, market-
ing, organization and management studies. For instance, Lacity et al. (2009) relate ITO success to 
stronger governance, both contractual and relational, through a clearly definition of contracts and ex-
pectations, open communication, open sharing of information, mutual dependency, and high levels of 
trust. While most of prior studies focus on one or a few aspects on the understanding of ITO govern-
ance, a comprehensive literature review is needed to synthesize these aspects into a general frame-
work. To our knowledge, such literature review on the specific topic of outsourcing governance is still 
missing, especially in the discipline of Information Systems (IS), which actually serves as a leading 
knowledge resource for outsourcing research (Dibbern et al. 2004).  
As mentioned above, since the concept of governance in ITO has multiplex interpretations and has 
been studied from different angles, our inquiry is to develop a comprehensive framework of ITO gov-
ernance that delineates the various mechanisms leading to the effectiveness of the overall ITO process. 
Motivated by this purpose, we analysed scholarly contributions on the concept of governance in the 
particular field of ITO. We have to emphasize that this review focuses on the contributions of out-
sourcing governance in the discipline of IS, as ITO is essentially different from the outsourcing of oth-
er business functions, such as manufacturing, logistics, human resource, etc., due to the pervasiveness 
of IT/IS and its tight interrelationship with other functions in modern organizations (Dibbern et al. 
2004; Willcocks, Fitzgerald, & Lacity, 1996). Therefore we choose to concentrate and position our re-
view on the outsourcing literature in mainstream IS journals to identify main research strands. These 
findings are then commented thoroughly with comparison to understandings in reference disciplines. 
While the concept of governance in reference disciplines has been evolved through multiple theoreti-
cal perspectives, within ITO it is has been analysed overwhelmingly through the few lenses of contract 
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and relations, restricting the impact and the diffusion of ITO research to other disciplines. We con-
clude this analysis identifying, within the line of reference disciplines, other mechanisms that could be 
investigated by the ITO community and integrated into a new framework of ITO governance.   
2 Literature review approach 
In this study, one of the purposes is to trace the research development on the governance of ITO, 
which is distinctive from the outsourcing of other services or products. Moreover, from the beginning 
of ITO research, the discipline of IS has contributed as a leading knowledge resource for outsourcing 
research in general (Dibbern et al. 2004). Therefore, we choose to first focus our literature search 
within the “Senior Scholars’ Basket of Journals”1 of IS, including European Journal of Information 
Systems (EJIS), Information Systems Journal (ISJ), Information Systems Research (ISR), Journal of 
Information Technology (JIT), Journal of Management Information Systems (JMIS), Journal of Stra-
tegic Information Systems (JSIS), Journal of the Association for Information Systems (JAIS), and MIS 
Quarterly (MISQ). The keywords for our literature search include “outsourcing”, “offshoring” and 
“governance”, and the original search resulted in a list of 85 articles. With this preliminary list, we 
first read each abstract to select the articles with a primary focus on the topic of ITO. Then, we 
browsed the full text of each article to locate and analyse the parts that relate to governance in particu-
lar. With this step we selected the articles that have discussed ITO governance either as a primary top-
ic, or as a part of an integrated framework. We decided not to filter out the latter cluster of articles be-
cause they have shown various contexts where governance has been studied, and therefore are also 
important contributions to the understanding of ITO governance. This is also the reason why we did 
not adopt the filtering strategy by browsing the abstract first, as many of the latter articles does not 
specifically mention governance in their abstracts. As a result of this process, 34 relevant articles are 
identified from the basket journals, dating from 1992 to 2014 (See Appendix).  
Our design of filtering process, as mentioned above, has also been the first step of our analytical pro-
cess leading us to two groups of articles based on the positioning of governance in the research: 1) 
ITO governance as a primary topic, or 2) ITO governance as a part of the entire framework. Within the 
first group, we browsed each article’s introduction and conclusion, and coded it with the aspects of 
governance in its focus. For articles in the second group, we analysed the contents dedicated to gov-
ernance, and also generated codes according to the relevant governance aspects. These codes are com-
pared and aggregated constantly during the course of analysis. The findings of this part are presented 
in section 3. 
Besides IS journals, the topic of governance has also been actively discussed in other reference disci-
plines such as economics, marketing, organization and management studies. These alternative disci-
plines have generated a rich body of knowledge on governance in general. As these findings are dis-
persed in myriad journals and books in different research fields, considering the scope of this paper, 
we choose to synthesize prior knowledge in reference disciplines on the basis of seminal works, used 
primarily by the ITO community, instead of another comprehensive literature review. The aim of this 
part (see section 4) is to provide an overview of governance in different disciplines in order to provoke 
comparison with the findings from ITO research and detect opportunities for new studies on ITO gov-
ernance. 
3 Findings on Governance in ITO Research 
The process of literature analysis has led us to find two strands on the research aspects of ITO govern-
ance, i.e. the structure and the mechanisms of governance. On one hand, in the original texts, different 
                                                     
1 http://aisnet.org/?SeniorScholarBasket 
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articles address these two concepts in distinctive terms as “governance structure” and “governance 
mechanism”; on the other hand, most articles study either one of governance structure or mechanism, 
although a few exceptions have included both concepts in the discussion. For example, Clark, Zmud, 
and McCray (1995) view governance mechanism as one aspect in the governance structure. In the spe-
cific context of multi-sourcing, Bapna et al.’s (2010) research comment involves not only multi-
sourcing governance structure such as the guardian vendor model, but also contractual and relational 
mechanisms of governance. The distribution of articles, respectively on governance structure and gov-
ernance mechanisms, is illustrated on publication years in Figure 1, manifesting the growing research 
interest on governance mechanisms in recent years. However, governance structure dates back from 
earlier studies, and has also had stimulated research attention in certain periods of time. The reviewed 
articles are listed in Table A1 in the Appendix, with information on their theoretical accounts. In the 
following sections, we will show our findings on both governance structure and mechanisms, particu-
larly how they are defined and discussed in the literature, as well as emerging themes and context in 
each strand. 
 
Figure 1 Distribution of articles on publication years
2
 
3.1 Governance structures: Market, hierarchy, and network  
Recognized as the earliest research article on ITO (see Dibbern et al., 2004), Loh and Venkatraman 
(1992) regards ITO itself as a new governance structure besides Inter-organizational IT governance. 
Through ITO contractual arrangement, the traditional IT governance constructed in internal hierarchy 
is shifted and extended to the external market. Thereafter, this original view is complemented and en-
riched with the proliferation of ITO literature. In recent works, the concept of ITO governance struc-
ture is increasingly being separated from the field of IT governance. The boundary of research per-
spective also expands from the client’s decision (e.g. make-or-buy) towards the understanding and 
management of ITO relationship as an entity. Increasingly, governance structure is referred to as the 
structure to organize the whole ITO relationship, instead of a set of separate firms. As a representative 
example, Mani, Barua, and Whinston (2010) defined ITO governance structure as “the ownership and 
control structure used to formalize the relationship, and distinguish among these structures by the lev-
                                                     
2 In this figure, the total number of articles is 36, because the two articles, i.e. Clark et al. (1995), Bapna et al. (2010) are in-
cluded in both strands of governance structure and governance mechanism. 
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el of hierarchical control, length, and extent of formalization” (p.44-45), manifesting the holistic ap-
proach with relational focus.  
Consistent with ITO research in general, specifically on governance structure, the theoretical founda-
tion mostly derives from Transaction Cost Economics (TCE); besides the term of “governance struc-
ture”, synonyms such as “governance forms” and “governance modes” are also widely adopted from 
Williamson’s work on TCE (Williamson, 1975, 1979, 1986, 1994). Determined by the properties of 
transactions, three types of governance structures are recognized: i.e. market, hierarchy, and network 
(Miranda & Kavan, 2005). The understanding of governance structure types is shown as manifold in 
the ITO literature. Earlier literature mostly discusses about the choice of governance structure as a part 
of the sourcing decision, focusing on the two types of market and hierarchy. In Figure 1, we can ob-
serve a peak in terms of publication numbers on governance structure in 1995, where all the contribu-
tions are from a special issue in JIT, on “Information Systems Outsourcing in Theory and Practice”. 
Many articles from this special issue have synthesized early works on ITO governance, and are valua-
ble sources for us to learn about this research strand in early 1990s. Following Loh and Venkatraman 
(1992) and appropriating Williamson (1975, 1979), Cronk and Sharp (1995) attributes market govern-
ance to the “outsource” option and hierarchy governance to the “insource” option, suggesting the 
choice of governance structure to be consistent with the “make-or-buy” decision. This dichotomous 
definition of market/external governance as outsourcing and hierarchy/internal governance as insourc-
ing has been adopted by many subsequent studies, especially from the theoretical perspective of TCE. 
The three characteristics of transaction, i.e. asset specificity, frequency, and uncertainty are considered 
to impact the cost aspect of governance, including both production cost and transaction cost. The op-
tion of outsourcing and market governance structure leads to lower production cost and higher transac-
tion cost; vice versa for insourcing and hierarchy governance (Alaghehband, Rivard, Wu, & Goyette, 
2011; Cheon, Grover, & Teng, 1995; Wang, 2002; Watjatrakul, 2005). Besides TCE, other theoretical 
foundations are also discussed in the study of governance structures. For example, Cheon et al. (1995) 
examined the two governance structures in TCE, as well as in Agency Cost Theory (ACT) and Re-
source-Based Theory (RBT). ACT attributes different agency costs to different sourcing options, and 
evaluates respective advantages of governance choices in relation with contracting choices, i.e. out-
come-based contract for market governance, and behaviour-based contract for hierarchy governance. 
Meanwhile, RBT explains the trends towards market governance and the outsourcing option with the 
resource and capability gaps in the existing IS function of a firm (see also Grover, Cheon, & Teng, 
1994). Other studies, though adopting the similar view on ITO as a governance structure of vertical 
disintegration, have questioned the internal versus external dichotomy on governance structure. As a 
part of ITO decision making framework, De Looff (1995) pointed out that the “real life” of govern-
ance exists between the pure “market versus hierarchy” dichotomy. Elements of these two types of 
“pure structures” are intertwined in various outsourcing contracts and relationships. This is to say, hi-
erarchy contracts/relationships can involve market elements and vice versa. In addition to vendor se-
lection, this study also argues for the importance of taking the relationship and various arrangements 
of outsourcing into consideration in the decision phase. Furthermore, Aubert, Houde, Patry, and 
Rivard (2012) extend the dichotomous view by adding the third option of mixed-governance to the 
conventional choices between in-house and total-outsourcing. However, in their perspective to gov-
ernance, outsourcing is still one option of the governance structures, and the disintegrative view of 
ITO still serves as a premise of the analysis. 
With the increasing adoption of outsourcing, more research attention on ITO has been attracted from 
the “make or buy” decision to the management of relationships. Hence, a holistic approach to ITO re-
search emerges besides the traditional view of ITO as vertical disintegration. In effect, the notion of 
network governance is introduced as a new type of governance structure (Adler, 2001; Miranda & 
Kavan, 2005; Powell, 1990; Thorelli, 1986). Actually, the definitions of the market, hierarchy and 
network governance are all transformed in this new holistic view of ITO. As defined by Miranda and 
Kavan (2005) in their synthesis on ITO governance, “the market is an institutionally derived and 
transaction- or contract-based governance form; the hierarchy is an institutionally derived authority-
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based form; the network is a socially-derived informal form” (p.153). This definition shows the ex-
pansion of research perspective from the participating firms to the overall level of ITO relationships. 
In contrast to the traditional view where ITO is only one of the three structural options, here all three 
structures of governance relate to the ITO relationship as an entity. Corresponding to the new under-
standing of market, hierarchy, and network governance, Lee, Miranda, and Kim (2004) identified three 
gestalts of ITO strategy, respectively arm’s length, independent, and embedded. Arm’s length strategy 
is related with market governance, where the structure is loosely coupled and vendors are interchange-
able. The independent gestalt, corresponding to the hierarchy governance, is similar to the insourcing 
strategy, but resources are acquired through minimal outsourcing arrangement and then managed in-
ternally. The strategy for network governance appears in form of embedded gestalt, with comprehen-
sive outsourcing, and a strong relational focus. Although no clear effects of the independent/hierarchy 
strategy is indicated in their findings, the cost-efficient effect of arm’s length/market strategy and best 
performance of embedded/network strategy on technology catalysis are confirmed. In addition, Mi-
randa & Kavan (2005) circumscribe elements of the three governance structures into each outsourcing 
stage. They inscribe market and hierarchy governance into the structural alternatives on the decision 
stage (i.e. promissory contract), and attribute hierarchy and network governance as the options on the 
post-adoption stage (i.e. psychological contract).  
Besides the typology of market, hierarchy and network, governance structure of ITO is also studied 
with different terminologies and in emerging contexts. As an early contribution, Clark et al. (1995) 
discuss governance structure as the decision structure of ITO, with inherent trade-offs including the 
length of contract, the amount of governance costs, and the level of flexibility in the governance 
mechanism. Bapna et al. (2010) present a research agenda on governance structure specifically in the 
context of multi-sourcing to foster cooperation and coordination among multiple vendors in the ITO 
relationship, proposing more research on new structures such as the guardian vendor model. In the 
evaluation of Business Process Outsourcing (BPO) performance, Mani et al. (2010) regard governance 
structure as a component of information capabilities. With the information processing view, they ex-
tend the traditional TCE view which focuses only on incentive alignment; in addition, they argue that 
different governance structures also support the cross-boundary coordination and information pro-
cessing in different extent. Mahnke, Wareham, and Bjorn-Anderson, (2008) examine the role of in-
termediaries in the offshore outsourcing of IT. This “middlemen” model emerges as a tailored govern-
ance structure to overcome the cultural, cognitive and operational obstacles in cross-border inter-firm 
relationships. 
3.2 Governance mechanisms: Contractual vs. relational 
Governance structures, reviewed in the last section, are different options to define a framework shap-
ing the governance of ITO. Under a certain opted governance structure, governance mechanisms refer 
to the synergic processes and practices through which ITO governance is realized and embodied. The 
mainstream literature recognizes two categories of governance mechanisms, i.e. contractual and rela-
tional governance (Huber, Fischer, Dibbern, & Hirschheim, 2013; Lioliou, Zimmermann, Willcocks, 
& Gao, 2014; Poppo & Zenger, 2002). In search for endogenous theory in ITO research, Lacity et al. 
(2011) recognize both contractual and relational governance as important categories of constructs in 
the potential theory of ITO. They also concisely define contractual governance as “the formal contrac-
tual controls used to govern ITO”, and relational governance as “the informal controls and relation-
ship attributes between client and supplier firms” (Lacity et al., 2011, p.150). This succinct definition 
clearly manifests the dichotomy of formal and informal nature of control mechanisms in governance, 
which is also a key aspect elaborated in the literature of ITO governance. In addition, with the emerg-
ing notion of psychological contract (Kim et al., 2013; Koh et al., 2004; Lioliou et al., 2014), the type 
of contract mechanisms become another key aspect in both categories of contractual and relational 
governance. The characteristics of these two aspects in contractual and relational governance are 
mapped in Table 1 and will be discussed in the following sections. 
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Governance mechanism Contractual Relational 
Contract Specified legal contract Psychological contract 
Control  Formal control Informal control 
Table 1 Key aspects of governance mechanism 
3.2.1 Contractual governance: Contract and control mechanisms 
Contractual governance is realized through the mechanisms of formal contract and controls. On ITO 
governance contracts, prior research has investigated the design of contractual structure (Chen & 
Bharadwaj, 2009; Gefen, Wyss, & Lichtenstein, 2008; Mani, Barua, & Whinston, 2012) and the con-
sequence of contractual choices (Bhattacharya, Gupta, & Hasija, 2014; Mani, Barua, & Whinston, 
2013). We observe two forms of contract structures prevailing in the studies of ITO contractual struc-
ture, either based on fixed-price (FP) or time-and-material (TM) assessment (Gopal, 
Sivaramakrishnan, Krishnan, & Mukhopadhyay, 2003). FP contracts adopt an ex-ante negotiated 
fixed-price payment method, while TM contracts opt for ex-post payment based on the evaluated time 
and effort of vendor to produce the deliverables for the client. Drawing on TCE, Chen & Bharadwaj 
(2009) analysed the effects of transactional characteristics on different governance provisions, includ-
ing monitoring, dispute resolution, property rights, and contingency provisions; they found such ef-
fects will vary under different contracting conditions of FP or TM. Introducing business familiarity as 
an emerging aspect on contractual governance, Gefen et al. (2008) examined its role on the contractual 
choice between FP and TM; they argue that increased business familiarity does not directly grant ven-
dors with higher prices in the ITO contracts, but rather changing the ITO relationship towards the 
more profitable TM contracts. In the specific context of BPO, Mani et al. (2012) incorporate infor-
mation structure into contract structure; their findings suggest that the impact of information structure 
in form of use and performance is greater in TM contracts than in FP contracts. In a more recent study, 
Bhattacharya et al. (2014) categorize the two dominant contracting structures into a synthesized type 
of cost-plus contract, and compared its contractual efficiency with gain-share contract on the incentive 
for coordination in joint improvement efforts. Their findings account for the optimal combination of 
different contractual types, which is contextualized in the observability of efforts. In addition, Mani et 
al. (2013) provide an interesting approach using the variation of equity price to evaluate the conse-
quence of contractual choices between fixed- and variable-priced contracts; their results indicate an 
alert on the danger of shareholder value loss due to the mismatch of contract choices with the nature of 
ITO relationships and outsourced tasks.  
Besides ITO contracting designs and consequences, research on contractual governance also examines 
different control mechanisms on the basis of formal contracts. Choudhury and Sabherwal (2003) posi-
tion control as an important aspect of ITO governance. In their study of outsourced software develop-
ment projects, the portfolio and dynamics of two modes of controls are examined, respectively formal 
and informal controls. In each mode of control, two categories of control mechanisms are investigated; 
formal controls include outcome and behaviour control, while the informal mode involves clan control 
and self-control. With an evolutionary view, the authors illustrate the dynamics of control portfolios 
throughout the course of outsourced projects, where outcome control dominates the starting portfolio 
and behaviour control is added in a later stage. These formal control modes mobilize mechanisms of 
specification and monitoring on both outcomes and behaviours of vendors, which are carefully consid-
ered and heavily reliant on the formal contract. The informal control mechanisms are found to be more 
difficult in this study under outsourcing context, and will be discussed in the next section. An example 
of a typical formal control mechanism is the concept of mechanistic governance established by 
Srivastava & Teo (2012), which requires the specified formal contract to be closely followed in a 
mechanistic manner, “not allowing for any deviations from the pre-specified outcomes and proce-
dures” (Srivastava & Teo, 2012, p.118). As in its definition, this governance mechanism strictly exer-
cises both outcome and behaviour controls, while accentuating contract specificity. The authors argue 
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for the viability and significance of mechanistic governance for better performance of offshore out-
sourcing, whereas its effects on other contexts are not elaborated.  
3.2.2 Relational governance: Contract and control mechanisms 
While the significance of contractual governance has been underscored for outsourcing success, the 
importance of relational governance has also been recognized since the early years of ITO research. 
For instance, Clark et al. (1995) noted that “Those happiest with their current outsourcing arrange-
ments were those with a limited set of tightly defined contractual elements with a larger portion of the 
relationship handled through joint agreements consisting of broader performance objectives and ap-
propriate governance mechanisms.” Although the concept of relational governance was not fully es-
tablished at that time, we can already observe the essential elements of this governance mechanism 
from this early account. On one hand, in such governance mechanisms, tightly defined contractual 
terms are limited or are being used in a limited extent. On the other hand, the control mechanisms with 
relational characteristics are emphasized, as distinct from document-based formal controls in contrac-
tual governance. This understanding is also consistent with a recent study of Lioliou et al. (2014), who 
conceptualize relational governance with both elements of psychological contract and informal control 
mechanisms.  
The theory of psychological contract is first introduced to ITO research by Koh et al. (2004) as a lens 
to study ITO relationships. Contrasting from formal contract, the contractual nature of psychological 
contract is based on the mutual belief of obligations between the exchange parties. The sense of obli-
gation is therefore psychological binding on the individual level. The authors also reveal that individu-
al’s psychological contract, in both client and supplier firms, can influence ITO success. From a re-
verse aspect, Kim et al. (2013) focus on the breach of psychological contract to study its role on ITO 
governance and performance. Their results show that the effect of contractual governance, with formal 
legal contract and partnership agreement, on ITO outcome is fully mediated by vendor’s breach of 
psychological contract perceived by the client. Lioliou et al. (2014) explicitly add psychological con-
tract as an important mechanism in relational governance, and examined its substitutive effect to the 
formal contract, as well as its complementary association with other relational aspects.  
According to Choudhury and Sabherwal’s (2003) elaboration on control mechanisms, relational gov-
ernance involves informal control mechanisms such as self-control and clan control. In their study, the 
authors conclude that self-control is encouraged and enabled through behaviour control, and clan con-
trol is found to be more difficult in outsourcing context. However, the importance of trust, which is 
closely related to informal controls, has been recognized in ITO literature. On one hand, trust and con-
trol is regarded as two sides of a coin (Heiskanen et al., 2008); on the other hand, it is generally agreed 
that informal control mechanisms are trust-based (Fink, 2010; Sabherwal, 1999; Tiwana, 2010). The 
study of Heiskanen et al. (2008) show the dialectical relationship between trust and (formal) control in 
an ITO project, and posit that trust and control are “the different sides of the same coin”. Here trust is 
regarded as a governance mechanism complementary to formal controls. Tiwana (2010) extends the 
understanding of both formal and informal controls, and arguing that contract-based formal controls 
and trust-based informal controls are mutually compatible, as they can act as complements and substi-
tutes simultaneously. Underscoring the significance of relational mechanisms, Fink (2010) attributes 
informal controls (i.e. self-enforcement and social controls) as “effective governance” which enforces 
the ITO relationship. Therefore, despite the difficulty of implementing informal control in ITO context 
(Choudhury & Sabherwal, 2003), its positive influence on ITO outcome justifies the necessity to use 
this mechanism. To explore possibilities of informal control implementation, the study of Chua et al. 
(2012b) on clan control enactment in complex IT projects may shed some light in the context of ITO 
as well. 
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3.2.3 Emerging themes on governance mechanisms 
During our review on contractual and relational governance above, we have already recognized that 
these two categories cannot be discussed in absolute separation. In ITO practice, the establishment of 
relationship immediately follows contracting; in some cases, relationships start simultaneously as, or 
even before, contracts are signed. Therefore the consideration of both contractual and relational gov-
ernance is inevitable in the lifespan of ITO. An emerging theme in this research strand is on the com-
plementarity and substitution of the two categories of governance mechanisms on the general level, 
which is discussed with different approaches (Goo, Kishore, Rao, & Nam, 2009; Huber et al., 2013; 
Lioliou et al., 2014). Zooming in from the general categories, a few studies (Gopal & Koka, 2012; 
Tiwana, 2010) have scrutinized the interactions between specific mechanisms from each category, e.g. 
contracts and controls. Tiwana’s (2010) work explores the interaction between formal and informal 
controls, providing suggestions on the combination of different control mechanisms under various sit-
uations. Gopal and Koka (2012) problematize the prevailing view of the universally beneficial role of 
relational governance by arguing for its asymmetric benefits on client and vendor. Such asymmetry of 
benefits of relational governance is in turn circumscribed under different contractual types, i.e. FP 
contract or TM contract.  
Beyond the dichotomy of contractual and relational governance, other governance mechanisms are al-
so being explored in two of the articles (Cao, Mohan, Ramesh, & Sarkar, 2013; Chua, Lim, Soh, & 
Sia, 2012a). In the context of vendor transition, where the reliability of both contractual and relational 
governance is limited, Chua et al. (2012a) adopt the perspective of threat balancing as a theoretical 
lens to support client strategies and governance during vendor transition. Cao et al. (2013) 
acknowledge the conflicts between contractual and relational mechanisms, and propose the process of 
“ambidexterity pendulum” to achieve the balance between them in the evolution of ITO relationships. 
Besides ITO in general, governance mechanisms in other specific contexts are also investigated, such 
as BPO (Rai, Keil, Hornyak, & Wüllenweber, 2012), offshoring (Mathew & Chen, 2013), and multi-
sourcing (Bapna et al., 2010).  
In summary, governance mechanisms could be considered as mechanisms finalized to the orientation 
of the inter-organizational action, conditioned by the characteristics of the relation; while structures, as 
in Williamson’s view, are the way to organize transactions. So ITO governance, differing from IT 
governance, is a concept that not only embraces the concept of internal and external control, but also 
includes elements of setting up and structuration of the external exchange relationship, as well as mon-
itoring and reinforcement aspects (Heide, 1994).      
4 Discussion 
The perspectives of governance vary with different philosophical stances and in different disciplinary 
traditions. The concept of governance has been used for years in many disciplines with different mean-
ings. Many studies adopt Williamson’s (1996) definition of governance, as “the means by which to in-
fuse order, thereby to mitigate conflict and realize mutual gains” (p.12). Williamson’s work is an im-
portant contribution to the transaction cost tradition, also for ITO studies. Recognizing that economic 
activity across such interfaces cannot proceed in an orderly manner in the absence of a structure for 
the governance of contractual relations, Williamson seeks theoretical understanding of the forces or 
processes responsible for modern-day capitalism’s “endlessly varied” systems of governance in which 
markets, hierarchy, and relational contracting are particularly prominent. Asset specificity, transaction 
recurrence, and the opportunism and bounded rationality of "contractual man" are positioned to be 
central elements in determining the nature of the optimal-that is, transaction cost minimizing-
contractual process for any particular type of transaction between two parties. However, in his work 
“The Mechanisms of Governance”, Williamson (1996) asserts the economics of governance needs to 
be informed both from the level of the institutional environment contributed by sociology, and from 
the level of the individual participants where psychology is implicated. Williamson summarized in that 
work the principal aspects in which “Organization Theory” can support Transaction Cost Economics 
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(Williamson, 1996). ITO researches has primarily focused on the classical perspective of TCE, inves-
tigating different option of outsourcing and market governance structure (i.e. lower production cost 
and higher transaction cost versus insourcing and hierarchy governance) and the characteristics of 
transaction (i.e. asset specificity, frequency, and uncertainty), emphasizing the cost aspect of govern-
ance, while leaving out more contextual and psychological aspects. 
Contract is still the main mechanisms in Jensen and Mackling’s (1976) Agency Theory, where the 
principal binds the agent through a formal agreement to perform a specific task representing princi-
pal’s interests, where the main issue is to align agent’s goals and interest through a better information 
sharing and the use of incentives, mostly during the pre-contracting phase. During the post-contracting 
phase the main problem is related to the effectiveness of control and its costs. The objective is to min-
imize controlling costs thanks to a complete contacting, and lower risks due to a lack in information 
sharing. The main assumption is that contracts are complete specifying all responsibilities. However, 
contract can be incomplete, and according to Hart (1995), governance has the role to specify residual 
control rights, optimizing the trade-off between risks and incentives. However, the concept of control 
has been widely discussed with Organizational Control Theory with a twofold perspective: internal, 
within organizational boundaries, and external. The control is strictly related to the interpersonal influ-
ence and the concept of power. Some scholars (Oliver and Anderson, 1995) consider governance 
forms as tantamount to control systems. Others (Lai and Nevin, 1995; Stump and Heide, 1996; Brown, 
Dev and Lee, 2000) bear that control mechanisms allow governing such opportunistic behaviours. Ou-
chi (1980), similarly to Williamson, suggests a trichotomy of control mechanism: market, bureaucra-
cy, social and informal controlling i.e. clan control. In the market control, the price is still the main 
mechanism that includes all information useful to complete the transaction. Obviously, the market is 
efficient when the performance is unambiguous. Furthermore, based on Mayo (1945), Weber (1947) 
and Barnard (1968) studies, Ouchi claims that information useful to complete the transaction could be 
included into rules, where activities and outcomes are specified. Rules represent a standard to align 
the performance. As to rules that are costly and difficult to define, i.e. standards, it is possible to set 
such performance indicators as controlling mechanisms. The rise of complexity and ambiguity of tasks 
make the bureaucratic control ineffective, and any standard will be arbitrary and not fair. In the latter 
case, the governance of clan as normative process of socialization, defining and sharing a common set 
of values, is more effective. Today, indeed, we are experiencing rapid changes of the business needs, 
due to an accelerated growth and/or diversification of the markets, combined with the highly dynamic 
nature of technology; contract, as a governance tool, has some limits where the levels of uncertainty of 
the business and technology increase. Contract emerges as a successful tool where the business is rela-
tively steady. Therefore, it is necessary to add elements of flexibility and dynamism when the uncer-
tainty increases. Moreover, in the ITO community, we still have little knowledge about the use of 
standards and their role as inter-organizational interfaces, as well as the effectiveness of normative 
processes of socialization across firm boundaries and different cultures. 
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) introduce, for instance, the issue of inter-organizational influence, as so-
cial control processes. They analyse the phenomenon of behavioural interdependency where organiza-
tional activities depends on actions set by a different social player. Mechanisms of governance could 
be: acquisitions, members in the board of directors, and/or political actions and succession plans 
across the top positions of companies. A position into Boards of Directors, for example, can increase 
the level of information, the understanding about the relation between the organization and its envi-
ronment, the access to critical resources and the reputation and identification. Again, in ITO literature, 
we still know little on the interplay of mechanisms. For instance, the rules and the processes defined 
during the pre-engagement phase in terms of changing management, future service demand and im-
provement plans/actions, can influence social relations very much. Moreover, the adoption of a partic-
ular standard may play an important strategic role, in relation to the group that adopts the standard and 
all potential actors in the network, especially in presence of highly-specific technology. To sum up, we 
need more contingency studies on organization design (see e.g. Huber et al., 2013). 
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Other studies, as about Networks, Supply Chain Management, Marketing and Information Technolo-
gy, have brought useful insights about governance structures. Network organization (Miles and Snow, 
1986), network form of organization (Powell, 1990), organization networks (Uzzi, 1996), flexible spe-
cialization (Piore and Sabel, 1984), and quasi-firms (Eccles, 1981), are structures based on informal 
social systems that exchange, persistently in the long term, resources between separated legal entities 
(Perrow, 1992). These structures of governance are in contrary with hierarchical organizational struc-
ture with formal contract-based mechanisms. In this literature stream it is also clear that the critical 
role of the coordination process among the nodes of the network, as essence of the governance itself. 
Reciprocity, mutual adjustment, trust, cooperation, social norms allow high levels of coordination and 
control (Walker, 1988; Doz, 1988; Hakansson and Johanson, 1988; Dore, 1987). Supply Chain Man-
agement literature, instead, has widely used the concept of inter-organizational coordination and the 
use of structures to approach to the governance topic. The governance represents the way to get an ef-
fective management of the supply network and combine individual objective with the need of a supe-
rior performance in the chain (Richey et al., 2010). This goal is reached by an integration of activities 
and processes, from the provisioning to production and distribution, through the whole supply chain, 
and by sharing information among all member of the chain mainly in the planning phase (Novack et 
al, 1995; Ellram and Cooper, 1990; Cooper et al. 1997). About the structure, Cooper at al. (1997) con-
sider the decisions related to the role, capacity and number of physical entities like stores, plants, re-
tailers etc. The design of the structure has a critical role for the effectiveness of the inter-
organizational governance. Moreover, Heide (1994), with “Inter-organizational Governance in Mar-
keting Channels”, contributed to the analysis of the use of coordination mechanisms across all phases 
of engagement: starting; operating; closing. Timing is a critical variable in Heide’s concept of govern-
ance. The intensity of information sharing, transparency, incentive alignment, socialization should be 
high ex ante, because it has an impact on the development of relations during following phases. While 
the definition of roles, the allocation of power and decision-making, the definition of the performance 
monitoring systems and incentive rules should be set up during the operational phase. Characteristics 
of the structure of governance and mechanisms rely on the time frame considered. ITO studies should 
address the design of governance that avoids costly redundancy, and scrutinize much more into the 
concept of inter-organizational coordination and timing. As exercising governance is costly and re-
source consuming, it is inefficient to pursue several functionally equivalent governance mechanisms 
simultaneously (Huber et al, 2013). The debate should not be confined to complementarity and substi-
tution of relational and contractual forms, missing contingency variables and the adaptation processes 
into event chains (Huber et al, 2013).  
5 Research gaps and future directions 
While different theories have been used in ITO research, manifesting the effort on theoretical under-
standing of the ITO phenomena from different aspects, we still lack an integrated theoretical frame-
work to analyse the governance phenomenon in ITO. While indigenous theories are certainly desired 
to truly understand and engage with the phenomenon at hand, Benbasat and Zmud (2003) note that the 
usage of “reference disciplines” can still be effective for IS researchers if the theories are adapted and 
contextualized to the IS phenomena.  Similarly, although Grover (2013) admits that reference disci-
plines can be a constraint for IS researchers, he still suggest us to engage with reference disciplines 
through “two-way interaction” (p.278), i.e. to be informed while also to challenge or even change the 
referenced disciplines with the IS context. In this way, theories can be incubated and the original theo-
ries can be enriched. Meanwhile, mobilizing reference disciplines can also elicit innovative theoretical 
contributions if multiple theoretical lenses are used instead of monistic theorizing (Grover, 2013). 
Since the beginning of ITO research, it is evident that much effort has been appropriated on the inte-
gration of multiple reference disciplines in both conceptual and empirical works, such as Cheon et al. 
(1995), Gefen et al. (2008), Kern and Willcocks (2000), Sankaranarayanan and Sundararajan (2010), 
etc. Beyond such theoretical integration, through more than two decades of knowledge accumulation 
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and exploration, the ITO research community now has opportunity to inform the reference theories as 
well. 
Based on the emerging understandings from our analysis both in ITO literature and in reference disci-
plines, we establish that “structuring" the governance means defining the combination of an appro-
priate portfolio of governance structures, together with different coordination mechanisms at different 
stages of the ITO lifecycle. This combination should consider, in a contingency approach, the problem 
of uncertainty, in terms of technology’s dynamism and of the business evolution. For example, a strict 
contractual control in dynamic business can involve a vicious cycle of suspects and recriminations, in 
which the provider could adopt an opportunistic behavior in technological change situation, the real 
needs of the customer would be failed. The contract is not able to prompt in itinere the actions and re-
actions of the counterpart towards each other. On the other hand, abandoning the contract towards a 
purely trust-based relationship could also create an uncontrolled consequence, such as unreasonable 
increase of the demands from the customer which is detrimental to the provider. So “vicious” process-
es would start in which everlasting activities of negotiation could lead significant negative effects both 
about the behavior of the actors and the operative success of the relation, not mentioning the develop-
ment of the trust is never an immediate process.  
As defined above, we view governance as a mechanism to induce the orientation of the inter-
organizational action, conditioned by the characteristics of the relation. In this definition we underline 
the concept of orientation, coordination and relational characteristics. This approach is not mechanistic 
when referring to the link between tools used for the management of the inter-organizational relation 
and the its outcomes, taking into account the socio-technical nature of inter-firm relations and the role 
of organizational actors executing the organization processes.  Hence we propose the concept of “ori-
entation”, emphasizing its dynamic nature. As for the same tool of governance, we practice a distinc-
tion between “characteristics of the relationship” and “coordination mechanisms”. Regarding the char-
acteristics of the relationship, it is difficult to identify a complete set of conditions for its definition. 
Based on the theories analyzed, it is possible to focus on some of the key conditions to identify simi-
larities and differences. The basic idea is that the relations, in the short or medium term, are character-
ized on the basis of certain dimensions, for instance, asset specificity, uncertainty, frequency, charac-
teristics of the product, routinizing vs. flexibility (Becker, 2004), the existence of mutual dependency, 
conflict or trust. These dimensions cannot be modified by the actors in the short term and, therefore 
will affect the relationship regardless of the strategic intentions of the actors. Unlike for the character-
istics of the relationship, the actors can choose and modularly use different coordination mechanisms. 
These include the structural mechanisms such as the level of information exchange (i.e. directionality, 
frequency, quality, type of information, utilities, etc.), the type of contract (i.e. duration, format, for-
malization, mechanisms of profit sharing), performance monitoring, and the instruments of knowledge 
integration (i.e. shared meanings, shared norms). 
6 Conclusions 
Our synthesis of prior knowledge support and enrich a deeper integration of the key governance struc-
tures and mechanisms, in order to achieve superior benefits of ITO and to organize the ITO efforts 
more effectively in different situations of uncertainty. In ITO research, we still lack an integrated 
framework of analysis on the governance between client and supplier, in terms of structure and mech-
anisms. Furthermore, both research strands of governance structure and mechanism need to be more 
closely associated with ITO performance, especially under a specific uncertainty and considering a 
specific object of the transaction. We still lack understanding on the effectiveness of governance under 
certain contexts. More studies are also needed on concrete governance mechanisms, such as organiz-
ing tasks, integrating processes, use of standards, use of digital technology to support transparency, 
etc. Analysing research streams across ITO and other reference disciplines further underline the need 
to clarify the relations between the chosen governance and the characteristics of the business and tech-
nology. Evident in our findings, research on different aspects and topics of governance is ongoing and 
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the body of knowledge is constantly being enriched. Such variety of investigation will indeed produce 
a richer array of insights into the nature, extent, and direction of evolution on governance studies in a 
more dynamic and uncertain world. Therefore, with our findings, we accentuate the needs for more in-
terdisciplinary studies of governance in ITO in particular, and perhaps also in Information Systems in 
general.  
This study has several limitations. Even though we defined an appropriate boundary serving principal-
ly the IS community working on the topic of outsourcing, our findings are primarily limited to data 
gathered within the “basket journals” of IS discipline. To continue and deepen this work, we need a 
broader scanning in different journal databases, looking also into interdisciplinary field. This wider 
analysis will help to develop a more comprehensive theoretical framework of analysis of ITO govern-
ance and identify operational variables to test new hypothesis on how to evolve governance practices 










Alaghehband et al., 2011  JSIS TCE 
Aubert et al., 2012 JSIS TCE 
Bapna et al., 2010 ISR Incentive Theory 
Cheon et al., 1995 JIT RBV, RDT, TCE, Contingency Theory 
Clark et al., 1995 JIT TCE, Agency Theory, Power and Politics 
Cronk & Sharp, 1995 JIT Organizational Theories, TCE 
De Looff, 1995 JIT Division of Labour, Standard Economic Theo-
ry, Coordination Theory, TCE, Agency Theory, 
Power, Competitive Strategy 
Lee et al., 2004 ISR Contingency Theory, Residual Rights Theory 
Loh & Venkatraman, 1992 ISR Innovation Diffusion 
Mahnke et al., 2008 JIT Boundary Spanning 
Mani et al., 2010 MISQ Incentive Theory 
Miranda & Kavan, 2005 JIT Psychological Contract 
Wang, 2002 ISJ TCE 
Watjatrakul, 2005 JSIS TCE, RBV 
Governance 
mechanisms 
Bhattacharya et al., 2014 ISR Game Theory, Agency Theory 
Cao et al., 2013 JMIS Organizational Ambidexterity 
Chen & Bharadwaj, 2009 ISR TCE, Agency theory, Relational Exchange 
Theory 
Choudhury & Sabherwal, 2003 ISR Control Theory 
                                                     
3 Bapna et al., 2010 and Clark et al. 1995 belong to both strands; to avoid repetition, we only mention them under “govern-
ance structure”. 
4 This column includes reference theories, theoretical framework and streams of studies that are reviewed, adopted, or criti-
cized by these articles. Some commonly adopted theories are mentioned in abbreviations: TCE (Transaction Cost Econom-
ics), RBV (Resource-Based View, RDT (Resource-Dependence Theory) 
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Chua et al., 2012a JSIS Balance of Threat Theory 
Fink, 2010 JSIS Configurational Theory 
Gefen et al., 2008 MISQ Trust, Agency Theory, Incomplete Contract 
Goo et al., 2009 MISQ Relational Exchange Theory, Control Theory 
Gopal & Koka, 2012 MISQ Social Exchange Theory 
Heiskanen et al., 2008 JSIS Control Theory, Power, Trust 
Huber et al., 2013 JMIS Control Theory 
Kim et al., 2013 EJIS Psychological Contract 
Koh et al., 2004 ISR Psychological Contract 
Lioliou et al., 2014 ISJ Psychological Contract 
Mani et al., 2012 ISR Institutional Theory 
Mani et al., 2013 ISR Institutional Theory 
Mathew & Chen, 2013 JSIS Theory of Opportunism 
Rai et al., 2012 JMIS Control Theory 
Srivastava & Teo, 2012 JMIS Control Theory 
Tiwana, 2010 JMIS Control Theory 
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